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AGAINST A WALL OF STRICT
SEPARATION: MISSOURI'S CHURCH-
STATE DOCTRINE AND STATE
PROVISION OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
SERVICES TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS
When a state legislature passes and the governor signs into law a bill
which allows or mandates some type of contact between public and private
schools, the first question most attorneys ask is whether the program violates
the.establishment clause of the first amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. In Missouri, however, this should be the second question. The first issue
that should concern an attorney who considers such a statute passed in Mis-
souri is whether the statute violates any of the "religion clauses",, of the Mis-
1. For the purposes of this Note, the provisions of the Missouri Constitution
which placed restrictions on the state as to its contact with religion will be called the
"religion clauses" of the constitution. They are:
Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 6:
That no person can be compelled to erect, support or attend any place or
system of worship, or to maintain or support any priest, minister, preacher or
teacher of any sect, church, creed or denomination of religion; but if any per-
son shall voluntarily make a contract for any such object, he shall be held to
the performance of the same.
Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 7:
That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indi-
rectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any
priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference
shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or
creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.
Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 38(a):
The general assembly shall have no power to grant public money or property,
or lend or authorize the lending of public credit, to any private person, associ-
ation or corporation, excepting aid in public calamity, and general laws pro-
viding for pensions for the blind, for old age assistance, for aid to dependent
or crippled children or the blind, for direct relief, for adjusted compensation,
bonus or rehabilitation for discharged members of the armed services of the
United States who were bona fide residents of this state during their service,
and for the rehabilitation of other persons. Money or property may also be
received from the United States and be redistributed together with public
money of this state for any public purpose designated by the United States.
Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8:
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school
district or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation or
pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any religious creed,
church or sectarian purpose, or to help to support or sustain any private or
public school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other institution of
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souri Constitution. Those clauses place a more restrictive barrier between
church and state than does the federal Constitution,2 and thus an enactment
by the state legislature wishing to pass constitutional scrutiny must meet the
more restrictive guidelines set by the state constitution before federal constitu-
tional questions are considered.
The 84th Missouri General Assembly, in its first regular session enacted
and the governor signed into law a bill which mandates the type of contact
between public and private, home, or parochial schools which raises church-
state separation issues. The "Special Needs Adoption Tax Credit Act" (here-
inafter "Act") was amended by a committee of the Missouri House of Repre-
sentatives3 to contain sections which provide:
1. Children who regularly attend private, parochial, parish or home schools
but who attend "special educational services" in public school districts will be
considered in compliance with the state's mandatory attendance law. 4
learning controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian denomination
whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of personal property or real estate
ever be made by the state, or any county, city, town, or other municipal cor-
poration, for any religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever.
2. Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1976) (en bane), Paster v.
Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974) (en banc). For example, the federal constitutional
case of Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 61 (1947), allows public school boards to
provide for the transportation of parochial school children, while the Missouri case of
McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953) (en banc), does not. Also, the
federal case of Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), allows the lending of
textbooks by public school districts to parochial school children, while the Missouri
holding in Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974) (en banc), finds such loans
impermissible. See Luetkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo.), afid, 419
U.S. 888 (1973) (Missouri's church-state separation policy does not infringe upon any
rights protected by the United States Constitution); Brusca v. Board of Educ., 332 F.
Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1973), afl'd, 405 U.S. 1050 (1972); see also MoDonough v. Ayl-
ward, 500 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1973) (Missouri's strict policy on church-state separation
does not impermissibly infringe the right of free exercise of religion under the first
amendment nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution). Contra Note, Public Aid To Parochial Education in Missouri,
1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 279 (1976) (the "absolute separation of church and state" decreed
in Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 817, 163 S.W.2d 609, 614 (1942) (en banc) which
established Missouri's strict policy, was broader than necessary to resolve the issue
presented by the case and should be considered dicta rather than controlling law).
3. The provisions of the Act with which this Note is concerned were originally
introduced in the first regular session of the 84th General Assembly as Senate Bill 365.
That bill died awaiting action by the full Senate. The provisions, however, were added
to Senate Bill 402 by a House Committee. That bill passed the House on June 12,
1987, and the Senate adopted the House version of the bill on June 14, 1987. Governor
Ashcroft signed the bill into law on August 11, 1987.
4. This provision ensures that participating students will be considered in compli-
ance with the state's mandatory attendance law. In the 1966 case of Special Dist. for
the Educ. & Training of Handicapped Children v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo.
1966) (en banc), a statutory program similar to the one established by the Act was
struck down on the grounds that the program violated the state's mandatory attendance
laws. The law provided that students between certain ages must attend "some day
2
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2. A public school district which provides special educational services to such
school." Mo. REv. STAT. § 164.010 (1959) (now Mo. REv. STAT. § 167.031 (1986)).
The program in Wheeler allowed parochial school students to attend speech therapy
classes at a public school building during part of their six-hour school day. In Wheeler,
the court held the state's compulsary attendance law to mean that a student may at-
tend only one school for the six-hour school day and may not split his school day be-
tween two schools. 408 S.W.2d at 63-64.
The Act currently is being challenged in the Circuit Court of Cole County. Moore
v. Bartman, Case No. CV 187-1102CC (Cole County Circuit Court Sept. 8, 1987); see
infra note 6. Duane Benton, Attorney for the plaintiff in that suit, argues that the
Missouri Supreme Court in Wheeler did more than just apply the state's mandatory
attendance statute. He asserts that the court, while deliberately not reaching the Mis-
souri constitutional issue involved in the case, decreed that this sort of "shared time"
scheme (in which parochial school children are allowed to receive educational services
at public schools during the school day) will not be allowed in Missouri. Benton be-
lieves that such a policy statement in Wheeler would have been consistent with the
court's other holdings calling for an absolute separation of church and state. Telephone
interview on Nov. 25, 1987, with Duane Benton, Attorney for the plaintiff in Moore v.
Bartman, Case No. CV 187-1120CC (Cole County Circuit Court Sept. 8, 1987); see
infra note 6.
In 1971, the Attorney General of Missouri took a contrary position on the "shared
time" issue. Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. 71-133 (Oct. 28, 1971). In that opinion, the Attorney
General considered whether students who were not in the age group covered by the
compulsory attendance law could be excluded from attending vocational education clas-
ses because they were enrolled in religious schools. Id. at 2. In concluding that the
students could not be excluded, the Attorney General relied on several arguments that,
because of decisions since 1971, are of dubious validity today.
First, the Attorney General argued that the exclusion of parochial school students
from the vocational education program because of their choice of a religious education,
would constitute a denial of equal protection in violation of both the Missouri and
United States Constitutions. However, in Luetkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376,
383 (W.D. Mo. 1973), affid, 419 U.S. 888 (1974), a similar argument was rejected. In
that case, the denial of the provision of public transportation to religious school chil-
dren was argued to be a violation of equal protection. In disposing of this argument, the
court quoted the 1971 decision of Brusca v. State Bd. of Educ., 332 F. Supp. 275, 279
(E.D. Mo. 1971), afftd, 405 U.S. 1050 (1972):
All children of every or no religious denomination have the same right to
attend free secular public schools maintained by tax funds. The fact that a
child or his parent for him voluntarily chooses to forgo the exercise of the
right to educational benefits provided in the public school systems does not
deprive him of anything by State action.
Accordingly, the denial of participation in vocational education classes because of at-
tendance at religious schools would not be considered a state deprivation of educational
benefits, but rather a waiver of those benefits by choosing not to attend public schools.
Next, the Attorney General asserted that the exclusion of students from the voca-
tional education program because of their attendance at religious schools is an infringe-
ment on their right to freely exercise their religion. He stated that such an infringe-
ment could not stand "without the justification of a compelling interest." Op. Mo.
Att'y Gen. 71-133, at 12. However, the court in Luetkemeyer held:
We conclude without hesitation that the long established constitutional policy
of the state of Missouri, which insists upon a degree of separation of church
and state to probably a higher degree than that required by the First Amend-
ment, is indeed a "compelling state interest" in the regulation of a subject
19881
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non-public school students is entitled to state aid for the provision of such
services.
3. The Act will not change the scheduling authority of public schools provid-
ing services pursuant to the Act.
4. Public school districts will not be required to provide transportation to stu-
dents receiving services under the Act.
5. A public school district may not discriminate against any resident child in
the provision of special educational services because the "child regularly at-
tends a private, parochial, parish or home school."
6. The Act will take effect on January 1, 1988.1
By its terms, the Act requires that public schools provide, at public ex-
pense, special educational services to students who attend sectarian schools.
This requirement raises the question of whether the expenditure of public
funds for such a purpose violates the religion clauses of the Missouri Constitu-
tion and the establishment clause of the first amendment of the United States
Constitution.'
within the state's constitutional power.
Luetkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. at 386. Thus, to the extent that the denial of
"shared time" participation burdens the exercise of religion, such burden is justified by
a compelling state interest in adherence to the state's policy of strict separation be-
tween church and state.
The Attorney General further argued that the primary effect and purpose of al-
lowing shared time participation in vocational education services would not be aiding
religious schools. Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. 71-133, at 16. However, even if the effect of the
state funds spent for the provision of such services to religious school children is only to
aid the child, because the student attends a religious school he will be attributed a
religious purpose which will disqualify him from receiving state educational aid. Paster
v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 104-05 (Mo. 1974) (en banc); see infra notes 18-26 and
accompanying text.
The Attorney General next argued that other states which prohibit "direct or indi-
rect" aid to religion in their state constitutions nonetheless allow the provision of some
benefits to religious schools. In support of this argument, the New York case of Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1967), affid,
392 U.S. 236 (1968), was cited which allowed a textbook loan program which lent
books to private school students at public expense. Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. 71-133, at 19.
Such a program, however, was found to be prohibited under the Missouri Constitution
in the case of Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974) (en banc). This holding
seems to undercut the Attorney General's reliance on sister states' constitutional inter-
pretations as a guide for interpreting the Missouri Constitution's church-state separa-
tion doctrine.
Finally, the Attorney General asserted that because the first amendment of the
United States Constitution and the religion clauses of the Missouri Constitution were
passed for the same reasons, a federal case upholding a "released time" program
should be considered relevant to deciding the status of such a program under Missouri
law. Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. 71-133, at 17. But this assertion bears little weight, since even
if the reasons for their promulgation were the same, Missouri consistently holds that its
constitution establishes a stricter barrier between church and state than does the fed-
eral Constitution. See supra note 2.
5. Mo. REv. STAT. § 162.996 (Supp. 1987).
6. For a listing of the Missouri Constitution's religion clauses, see supra note 1.
[Vol. 53
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Federal establishment clause questions like the one here are dealt with by
application of the three prong test found in Lemon v. Kutzman:7
1. the state program must have a secular purpose,
2. it must have a primary effect other than the advancement of religion and
3. it must not have the tendency to excessively entangle the state in church
affairs.8
Under this analysis, the program established by the Act would probably pass
federal constitutional standards. Proponents could argue that the Act's secular
purpose is found in the state's interest in addressing the special educational
needs of all Missouri school children and its non-religious primary effect in the
provision of special educational services to resident children in need of such
services. A lack of entanglement is evident in the fact that school districts
need not change scheduling to accommodate the program, nor provide trans-
portation to or from religious schools, nor send public employees into religious
schools.
This argument is bolstered by the United States Supreme Court's deci-
The relevant passage of the first amendment of the United States Constitution states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. . . ." The scope of this Note is not intended to engender an
in-depth analysis of the federal constitutional issues presented by the Act, but rather is
intended to review the Missouri constitutional issues raised.
In addition to the constitutional issues herein discussed, the Act is being chal-
lenged on several other grounds in the Cole County Circuit Court. Those grounds are
stated in the plaintiff's petition in Moore v. Bartman, Case No. CV 187-1102CC, at 8-
19 (Cole County Circuit Court Sept. 8, 1987), and include the following:
I. That the statute is void under the holding of Special Dist. for the Educ.
& Training of Handicapped Children v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966)
(en banc). See supra note 4.
2. That the amendments to the bill in the House of Representatives changed
the bill's original purpose, and that amendments that caused such a change
are prohibited by Article III, § 21 of the Missouri Constitution. See supra
note 3.
3. That the bill did not set forth in full all the sections to be amended, and
failure to do so violates Article III, § 28 of the Missouri Constitution.
4. That the bill would require school districts to perform new activities with-
out full state funding in contravention of Article X, § 21 of the Missouri
Constitution.
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8. Id. at 612-13; see also Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 716
(Mo. 1976) (en banc). An additional consideration of this test, which might be treated
under the "excessive entanglement" prong, is whether the law creates "an excessive
degree of political division along religious lines." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.3 (1986). Under this factor the issue of the constitutional-
ity of the present statute could go either way. During the legislative process, the bill's
chief supporter was the Missouri Catholic Conference, while its major opposition came
from the Missouri Baptist Convention. Although this points to a degree of political
divisiveness along religious lines, whether such a degree of divisiveness would be consid-
ered "excessive" is doubtful.
19881
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Sion in Wolman v. Walter,9 which held that an Ohio state aid program al-
lowing state personnel to provide therapeutic services to private school children
for health and educational disabilities at sites off of private school property did
not violate the federal Constitution. 10 The Court reasoned that the services
were not provided in a sectarian school and thus the danger of religious per-
meation of the program was removed."
Regardless of the resolution of the federal constitutional question
presented, however, to be a valid exercise of legislative power the Act must
survive the stricter standards of church-state separation provided by the Mis-
souri Constitution. Thus, an analysis of how Missouri's courts have interpreted
the religion clauses of the Missouri Constitution is necessary.
In the 1942 case of Harfst v. Hoegen," the Missouri Supreme Court con-
sidered a challenge to a local school board's incorporation of a catholic grade
school into the state public school system. The parish school, pursuant to the
school board's action, adopted the state's textbook choices and curriculum re-
quirements. But the school continued to be staffed by nuns in religious garb, to
be held on parish grounds, to begin each day with a morning prayer, to teach
religion, to display religious symbols, to celebrate masses, to offer the sacra-
ment of confession on Fridays, and to give a grade in religion on students'
report cards." In holding that these actions were a violation of the Missouri
Constitution, the Court announced that "our Constitution goes even further
than those of some other states"' 4 in prohibiting indirect or direct aid to reli-
gion. The court went on to state:
The Constitutional policy of our state has decreed an absolute separation of
church and state, not only in governmental matters, but in educational ones as
well. Public money, coming from taxpayers of every denomination, may not
be used for the help of any religious sect in education or otherwise.1"
While the factual circumstances of Harfst v. Hoegen are dissimilar to
those which would be expected under the Act, the announced interpretation of
the religion clauses of the Missouri Constitution is relevant. In decreeing "an
absolute separation of church and state" the court implies that no level of
state mandated or sponsored church-state contact would be deemed acceptable
under the state constitution.
9. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
10. Id. at 255; see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 17.4, at 1042-43 (1986).
11. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 245-48. Again, this treatment of the federal issue
should not be taken as a fully researched conclusion as to federal law, since the federal
implications of the Act are not the focus of this Note.
12. 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1942) (en banc).
13. Id. at 811-13, 163 S.W.2d at 610-11.
14, Id. at 816, 163 S.W.2d at 613. Note that while the court cited Article II, § 7
of the Missouri Constitution of 1875 in making this statement, that provision is the
predecessor of the identical language which appears in Article I, § 7 of the Missouri
Constitution of 1945 (current version).
15. Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. at 817, 163 S.W.2d at 614.
[Vol. 53
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The 1953 decision of Berghorn v. Reorganized School District No. 8,16
reaffirmed this degree of church-state separation. In that case, much like in
Harfst, a public school district took a parochial school into the public school
system. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding that:
[T]he state of Missouri has a fixed and definite policy to maintain free public
schools separate and apart from all religious, church or sectarian activities
and influences to the end that an absolute of choice of religion and freedom of
worship shall be unaffected by any religious influences, activity, proselyting
example and indoctrination through and intrusion into the free public school
system of the State of Missouri. * * * That it is the unqualified policy of the
state of Missouri that no public funds or properties, either directly or indi-
rectly, be used to support or sustain any [religious school] [sic] .... 17
The 1974 case of Paster v. Tussey' 8 applied this absolute separation doc-
trine in invalidating a statutory program which allowed for the purchase of
textbooks with public funds and the lending of those textbooks to children and
teachers of both public and private elementary and secondary schools.1 9 After
reviewing federal constitutional cases which presented strong arguments in
favor of the constitutionality of the program,20 the Missouri Supreme Court
stated that the "disposition of this case is not controlled by federal law nor
have the relevant provisions of the Missouri Constitution been made inopera-
tive." ' Resolving the case under Missouri law, the court held that the lending
of textbooks to teachers at private schools violated article I, section 6 of the
Missouri Constitution22 because such loans "supported" a teacher of a reli-
gious "sect".2 3
In treating the portion of the statute which allowed textbook loans to indi-
vidual students, the court considered arguments that they adopt a "parent-
pupil" benefit theory. 4 In so doing the court held that even if the expenditure
of funds for the provision of the textbooks was an aid to the individual pupil or
16. 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d 573 (1953).
17. Id. at 138-39, 260 S.W.2d at 582-83; see also Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d
97, 104 (Mo. 1974) (en banc).
18. 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974) (en banc).
19. Id. at 98-99.
20. Id. at 103-04.
21. Id. at 104.
22. See supra note 1.
23. Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d at 104.
24. In its analysis of the federal law that would be relevant to the case (if the
issues presented did not turn upon the stricter church-state doctrines of Missouri law),
the court noted that the United States Supreme Court had based its decision in Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (a federal case dealing with a similar textbook
loan program), on the "pupil benefit" or "pupil-parent benefit" theory. This theory was
used to uphold the textbook loan program even though it indirectly benefited private
schools. The Missouri Supreme Court considered the theory while noting that it did not
decide whether it was "at liberty to do so in light of the absolute separation of church
and state doctrine evidenced throughout the Missouri Constitution .... " Paster v.
Tussey, 512 S.W.2d at 104.
19881
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parent, such aid contravened the restrictions of the Missouri Constitution. The
court reasoned that an individual "can have and promote a sectarian purpose,
and by attending a private school designed for such a purpose [does], in fact,
promote the sectarian objective for which Art. IX § 8, prohibits the expendi-
ture of public funds."2 By so holding, the court announced that in Missouri
one who attends a sectarian school (at the elementary and secondary level, at
least) will be attributed that school's sectarian purpose and correspondingly
not be allowed to receive aid from the state in the area of education. 28
The Court in Mallory v. Barrera27 again applied Missouri's strict separa-
tion of church and state doctrine in prohibiting the use of federal pass-through
funds for the provision of teaching services on the premises of elementary and
secondary parochial schools. 8 In reaching this decision, the court first held
that the use of the federal Title I funds was to be governed by Missouri law
even though the contested expenditures had arguably been approved under
federal law.29 The court further held that the use of any part of the federal
monies to provide teaching services in parochial primary and secondary
schools would constitute both illicit aid to religion and support of a religious
school.30 The case stands as another example of the Missouri Supreme Court's
application of the state's own separation of church and state doctrine rather
than that of federal law, and of the court's unwillingness to allow state man-
dated or sponsored contact between secular and public schools.
While the Harfst, Berghorn, Paster, and Mallory cases based their hold-
ings on the provisions of the Missouri Constitution which explicitly prohibit
aid to religious sects or schools,31 the Missouri Supreme Court has also relied
on article IX, section 5 of the Missouri Constitution (which provides that pub-
lic school funds shall be used only to support public schools) 2 to prohibit con-
25. Id. at 104-05.
26. See Note, Constitutional Law - An Unqualified Policy on Public Aid to
Non-Public Schools, 40 Mo. L. REv. 342, 347 (1975) (discussing Paster v. Tussey and
Missouri's rejection of the child benefit theory).
27. 544 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
28. Id. at 561. The court also held that the use of such funds to provide text-
books and transportation was violative of the Missouri Constitution. Id. at 562.
29. Id. at 561.
30. Id.; see also Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. No. 79-31 (Jan. 10, 1979); Op. Mo. Att'y
Gen. No. 77-102 (May 16, 1977) (both opinions concluding that educational service
programs funded by federal Title I funds could not be conducted on the premises of
sectarian schools).
31. See supra note 1.
32. Mo. CoNsT. art. IX, § 5 states:
The proceeds of all certificates of indebtedness due the state school fund, and
all moneys, bonds, lands, and other property belonging to or donated to any
state fund for public school purposes, and the net proceeds of all sales of lands
and other property and effects that may accrue to the state by escheat, shall
be paid into the state treasury, and securely invested under the supervision of
the state board of education, and sacredly preserved as a public school fund
the annual income of which shall be faithfully appropriated for the establish-
[Vol. 53
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tact between public and religious schools. In McVey v. Hawkins,3 3 taxpayers
of Commerce Consolidated School District (hereinafter "Commerce") sought
to enjoin the school district's provision of transportation to parochial school
children.34 Commerce allowed the parochial school children to ride a publicly
owned, maintained and operated schoolbus from designated stops in the Com-
merce District to the district's boundary line with the adjoining Benton School
District. The parochial school was located in the Benton district.35 Uncontra-
dicted evidence showed that the bus traveled no further than it would have if
only transporting the public school students, did not change its route nor stops
to accommodate the parochial school students, did not need to increase the
number of buses used to transport Commerce students, and incurred no addi-
tional expenses whatsoever in the transport of the parochial school students.38
Nor did Commerce include the parochial school students in their requests for
state aid.37
Notwithstanding these facts, the Court held that the "Commerce District
was using public school funds to transport the parochial school children to a
private school," 38 that this use was not "for the purpose of maintaining free
public schools and that such use of said funds is unlawful."3"
In the 1966 case of Special District for the Educ. & Training of Handi-
capped Children v. Wheeler,40 the Missouri Supreme Court followed the arti-
cle IX, section 5 analysis of McVey in holding that a program in which public
funds were spent to send speech therapy teachers from the Special School Dis-
trict of St. Louis County into parochial schools was not an expenditure of
public school funds for the purpose of "maintaining free public schools. ''41 The
court accordingly held that the program was not permitted by the Missouri
Constitution.
The combination of these cases shows Missouri's strict policy of church-
state separation in the area of aid to religiously oriented primary and second-
ary schools. The Missouri Supreme Court has announced that the state Con-
stitution establishes an absolute separation of church and state in educational
matters.42 The court has eliminated the possibility of a "pupil-parent benefit
theory" justification of statutes or programs providing aid to parochial school
ing and maintaining of free public schools, and for no other purposes
whatsoever.
33. 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953) (en banc).
34. Id. at 47, 258 S.W.2d at 927.
35. Id. at 48, 258 S.W.2d at 928.
36. Id. at 54, 258 S.W.2d at 932.
37. Id. at 51, 258 S.W.2d at 930.
38. Id. at 54, 258 S.W.2d at 933.
39. Id. at 56, 258 S.W.2d at 934.
40. 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966) (en banc).
41. Id. at 63. For other issues considered in the Wheeler decision, see supra note
4 and accompanying text.
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students'3 and has invalidated levels of church-state contact which are permit-
ted by the United States Constitution." This is not to say, however, that the
court automatically invalidates every statute or program calling for church-
state contact upon which it has the opportunity to pass.
In the 1961 case of Kintzele v. St. Louis45 the court considered a chal-
lenge to the sale of land by the St. Louis Land Clearance for Redevelopment
Authority to St. Louis University, a catholic university. 48 The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's rejection of the challenge to the sale as "an unconsti-
tutional use of public power and public funds in aid of a private sectarian
school controlled by a religious denomination . . . . "4 The trial court found
that the University had been given no special or unfair consideration in the
bidding process and that it had paid "not less than the fair value of the
land." 8 Quoting a New York Court of Appeals case, the Missouri Supreme
Court agreed that the sale was "an exchange of considerations and not a gift
or subsidy, [and thus] no 'aid to religion' is involved ....
In Americans United v. Rogers5" the court upheld a state program which
provided grants directly to Missouri college students attending both public and
private Missouri colleges.51 After a discussion of federal law,53 the opinion
considered the Missouri constitutional issues involved. The court determined
that the payment of grants directly to an individual was not a violation of
Missouri constitutional provisions prohibiting taxation for anything but public
purposes53 and prohibiting the granting of public money to private persons.54
The court then turned to the church-state issues controlled by the Missouri
Constitution. In upholding the program, the court relied on both the "ex-
change of considerations" argument of Kintzele55 and a distinction in the na-
43. Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Mo. 1974) (en banc).
44. See supra note 2.
45. 347 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
46. Id. at 698.
47. Id. at 697.
48. Id. at 699.
49. Id. at 700 (quoting 64th St. Residences, Inc. v. New York, 4 N.Y.2d 268,
150 N.E.2d 396, 174 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 907 (1958)).
50. 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
51. Id. at 721-22; see also Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. No. 79-84 (Aug. 27, 1984).
52. 538 S.W.2d at 716-18.
53. Id. at 718-20. MO. CONsT. art. X, § 3 states:
Taxes may be levied and collected for public purposes only, and shall be uni-
form upon the same class or subclass of subjects within the territorial limits of
the authority levying the tax. All taxes shall be levied and collected by gen-
eral laws and shall be payable during the fiscal or calendar year in which the
property is assessed. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the
methods of determining the value of property for taxation shall be fixed by
law.
54. 538 S.W.2d at 718-20; see also supra note 1.
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ture of higher education from that of elementary and secondary education.56
The exchange of considerations analysis reasoned that because the fees
paid by a student to a religious university are in exchange for a college educa-
tion and often do not even cover the costs of the institution in providing that
education, it is questionable whether grants to students to help pay such fees
could be considered aid to that religious institution." The enrollment of each
additional student gives rise to obligations not covered by that student's tuition
and thus forces the school to have to find additional funding from some other
sources. The court questioned whether the encouragement of the creation of
such additional obligations could be considered aid.5 8
More importantly, the decision drew controlling distinctions between
higher education and elementary and secondary education. The court noted
that the state provides a free public education to all on the elementary and
secondary level and those who choose not to accept that free education and
attend a private school do so at their own behest and expense. 9 The court then
stated, "In contrast, the state does not provide a free college education and we
believe that attendance at other than public institutions at that level does not
have the same religious implications or significance .... -6" Finally, the court
pointed out that the Missouri Constitution prohibits aid to institutions con-
trolled by churches or religious sects. In the challenged statute the institution
attended by the student receiving a grant was required to be run by an "inde-
pendent board.""1 Thus, the court upheld the grant program as distinguishable
from its previous parochial school decisions:
we take solace in the fact that the parochial school cases with which this
court has dealt in the past involved completely different types of educational
entities than the colleges and universities herein involved. As suggested by the
proponents: 'Institutions of higher education are able to boast of academic
freedom, institutional independence, objective instruction, lack of indoctrina-
tion, faculty autonomy, mature students and a diversity of religious back-
ground in faculty and students.'6 2
Relying at least in part on the higher education distinction of Americans
United, the Court in Menorah Medical Center v. Health and Educational Fa-
cility Authority 3 upheld a plan which allowed the Health and Educational
Facility Authority (hereinafter "Authority") to purchase certain facilities with
tax exempt bond proceeds and lease those facilities to the Menorah Medical
Center (hereinafter "Menorah"), a hospital run by a Jewish board of direc-
56. See Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 720-21 (Mo. 1976) (en
banc).
57. Id. at 721.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 720-21.
60. Id. at 721.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 722.
63. 584 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
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tors." In holding that the scheme did not violate the Missouri nor the federal
Constitution, the court stated that it was only ruling on the "excessive entan-
glement" issue of the federal test. It noted several reasons why this issue was
not implicated, including: 1. the lack of direct state involvement ("The Au-
thority does not become a subdivision of the state simply because it deals with
tax exempt bonds and there is no impairment of state credit involved. Thus,
the state is not involved in establishing religion.""5), 2. the lack of a sectarian
purpose, 3. the funds involved being used in a neutral fashion, and 4. the facil-
ities involved were used at the higher education level - as opposed to the
elementary and secondary level. 6
The Kintzele, Americans United, and Menorah cases represent three situ-
ations in which the Missouri Supreme Court did not invalidate church-state
contact. Each of the cases involved religious institutions on the higher educa-
tion level, which are considered of a different nature for Missouri constitu-
tional purposes. Two involved "exchange of consideration" issues and the other
questioned the existence of any state action. Thus, the pivotal question for
purposes of a state constitutional analysis of the Missouri General Assembly's
enactment of the previously described sections of the Special Needs Adoption
Tax Credit Act is whether the Act is more appropriately treated by the princi-
ples of the Kintzele, Americans United, Menorah cases or the Harfst, Paster,
McVey line of cases.
Because the Act deals with the provision of special education services on
the elementary and secondary level and not the higher education level, it con-
tains a distinction which the Missouri Supreme Court considered important in
64. Id. at 76.
65. Id. at 87.
66. Id. The court treated the church-state issues in Menorah in a short and cur-
sory fashion. Unlike the previous church-state cases considered herein, the court made
no distinction between the constitutional analysis necessary on the state as opposed to
federal level. Instead, it lumped the analysis together, after stating that in Americans
United Missouri accepted the Lemon v. Kutzman "three-prong test." See supra notes
7-8 and accompanying text. This statement is problematic in that in Americans United
the court applied the Lemon v. Kutzman analysis to the federal establishment clause
issues but not to the church-state separation issues under the Missouri Constitution.
Perhaps this disparity can be explained by the court's rather quick treatment of the
church-state issues presented and their finding of several grounds to dismiss the
church-state argument. Some of these grounds would be applicable to both constitu-
tions (i.e., the distinction between higher education and primary and secondary educa-
tion and the lack of direct state involvement), and some only applicable to the federal
constitution (i.e., public purpose and the neutral fashion in which the funds are used).
Whatever the reason, it is very doubtful that the court intended to discard its long-
established and strict level of church-state separation in a five paragraph treatment of a
unique factual situation. Further, the Menorah court only dealt with the "excessive
entanglement" prong of the Lemon v. Kutzman test. The Missouri Supreme Court, in
the leading church-state cases herein mentioned, never explicitly nor impliedly relied on
such a test in reaching its decisions as to church-state issues. Thus, the meaning of
Missouri "recognizing this test" is unclear.
418 [Vol. 53
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/10
CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION
Americans United.6" In addition, the program does not require the private,
parochial, parish or home schools to pay for the services provided to their stu-
dents, and thus Kintzele's "exchange of consideration" rationale 8 is also inap-
plicable. Finally, to the extent Menorah's holding can be considered relevant
to church-state educational aid under Missouri constitutional law, two control-
ling distinctions are present: first, the present program unquestionably engen-
ders state expenditures and state action, and second, the Act deals with ele-
mentary and secondary institutions rather than those at a higher education
level.69
The Harfst, Paster, McVey line of cases is more directly applicable to the
program established by the Act. While the provision of speciaf educational
services mandated by the Act does not reach the level of church-state contact
as the incorporation of a parish school into the public school system as in
Harfst, the "absolute separation of church and state"70 is breached by the
state mandated and funded provision of educational services to religious school
students.
Correspondingly, to the extent that sectarian schools are relieved of the
responsibility of furnishing special educational services because their students
may obtain such services at public schools, the "unqualified policy of the State
of Missouri that no public funds or properties, either directly or indirectly, be
used to support or sustain any school affected by religious influences.... 7 1 is
violated.72 Once the program established by the Act is in place, parochial
schools need not hire teachers with the special qualifications necessary to work
with children who require special services, nor will they be forced to purchase
the educational equipment and materials used in the provision of such services.
To the degree that religious schools are able to save money by not providing
special education services, the Act works as an indirect aid to those schools.
In addition to the application of these broad prohibitions of church-state
contact in the area of education, the court's treatment of the "pupil-parent
67. Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 720-21 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
68. Kintzele v. St. Louis, 347 S.W.2d 695, 700 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
69. Menorah v. Health & Educ. Facilities Auth., 584 S.W.2d 73, 87 (Mo. 1979)
(en banc).
70. Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 817, 163 S.W.2d 609, 614 (1942) (en banc).
71. Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 138, 260 S.W.2d
573, 582 (1953) (emphasis added).
72. Bart Tichenor, attorney for the Missouri Baptist Convention, takes this argu-
ment even further. He argues that by allowing parochial schools to rely on the state for
the provision of specialized services in one area of the schools' curriculum, the Act
opens the floodgates to programs in other areas. While the Act only allows for the
provision of "special educational services," the same principles which motivated the
Act's passage could apply, mandating the provision of industrial arts, home economics
classes, advanced laboratory science and computer classes. Thus, although the degree
of aid afforded by relieving parochial schools of one specialized curricular responsibility
seems small, the potential for expansion of such relief could hardly be characterized as
insignificant. Telephone interview with Bart Tichenor, Attorney for the Missouri Bap-
tist Convention (April 8, 1988).
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benefit theory" in Paster v. Tussey is applicable to the Act more directly.
Under the analysis of Paster, even if the provision of special education services
to students of religious schools is considered simply an aid or benefit to the
pupil or his parents, such a benefit would nonetheless be held constitutionally
impermissible in Missouri. Because of the student's attendance of a sectarian
school he is assumed to be an adherent "of the same sectarian purpose"7 s as
possessed by the school. He is deemed to promote a sectarian objective for
which the expenditure of public funds is prohibited.74 Accordingly, he could
not receive state funded educational benefits.
To the extent that the holding in Mallory v. Barrera75 is based on the
fact that the teaching services provided were impermissible because they were
provided on parochial school property, the case seems to add little to the anal-
ysis of the program established by the Act. A broader reading of the case,
however, could cut in favor of or against the Act's validity. The case could be
read to hold that only teaching aid provided on sectarian school premises is
violative of the Missouri Constitution and teaching services provided on non-
religious property is acceptable. However, such an inference would extend the
holding of the case far beyond the facts upon which the court ruled. Nonethe-
less, if this reading of the case were supported by any later Missouri decisions,
it would seem dispositive of the issue presented by the Act (in that the Act
provides for services to be provided to non-public school students on public
school property). However, this reading has not been bolstered by any later
Missouri decisions.
A more expansive reading of the Mallory case could cut against the Act's
validity. The holding could be viewed as prohibiting the provision of publicly
funded teaching services to parochial school students. Again, this interpreta-
tion would extend far beyond the facts of the case. While there are no subse-
quent Missouri cases supporting this reading, it would seem to accord with the
"absolute separation of church and state" doctrine announced in Harfst7 and
respected in later cases.
McVey v. Hawkins,71 while seemingly dissimilar to the Act, provides sev-
eral factual comparisons which are helpful in analyzing the Act under the
Missouri Constitution's prohibition of spending public school funds for any
purpose other than the maintenance of public schools.78 The transportation
services provided in McVey are comparable to the education services required
by the Act in that both are publicly funded services provided off the premises
of the parochial or private school. In both situations, public officials were (or
are) not called upon to change schedules nor make special accommodations for
parochial school students. Although in McVey the transportation services pro-
73. Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 104-05 (Mo. 1974) (en banc).
74. Id.
75. 544 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1976) (en bane).
76. Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 817, 163 S.W.2d 609, 614 (1942) (en banc).
77. 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953) (en bane).
78. Mo CONsT. art. IX, § 5; see supra note 1.
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vided did not cost the school district any additional funds and the transporta-
tion of parochial school children was not included in state aid calculations, the
transportation services were still held to be violative of the Missouri Constitu-
tion because they were not for the purpose of establishing or maintaining pub-
lic schools.79
Thus, the fact that the state is required under the Act to pay for the
provision of special education services to participating parochial school chil-
dren, and is required to provide such services even if doing so might require
additional salary and capital expenditures, places the Act in dubious constitu-
tional standing under the McVey holding. Unless the provision of special edu-
cation services to religious school students can be shown in some way to aid in
the maintenance and support of free public schools, the program would seem
destined for the same fate as was the transportation services provided in Mc-
Vey v. Hawkins.
While the type of services provided in Special District for the Educ. &
Training of Handicapped Children v. Wheeler"° are similar to those which
would be provided by the Act, the usefulness of the case is limited in the same
way as Mallory v. Barreras1 above. Although the case holds that the provision
of this type of service in parochial schools is impermissible because it is not for
the purpose of maintaining free public schools,82 it does not reach the issue of
whether the same would be true were the services provided on public school
property.
To aggregate the analysis, reasoning and application of Missouri constitu-
tional law in cases involving contact between public bodies and religious
schools in such a way as to predict the outcome of the question of the validity
of the provisions of the "Special Needs Adoption Tax Credit Act" which in-
volve public schools in the provision of special educational services to private
school students is an elusive goal. However, the identification of several broad
trends or generalities is possible. First, the Missouri Supreme Court has jeal-
ously protected the state's restrictive policy of the separation of church and
state and is willing to reject federal characterizations of church-state issues in
order to preserve this strict separation doctrine. Further, the doctrinal excep-
tions made to the state's "absolute separation" policy are few and seem to
exclude elementary and secondary education. Finally, on the elementary and
secondary level, the court over many years has reviewed and invalidated vari-
ous types of public school-religious school contacts which are permitted under
federal law. Against this background, the probability of success of the Act is
slight.
DANIEL V. CONLISK
79. McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. at 56, 258 S.W.2d at 933-34.
80. 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966) (en banc).
81. 544 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
82. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60 at 63.
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